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The subject of this symposium issue is the status of the unitary executive under the American Constitution. For the purposes of this
Article, the term “unitary executive” receives a narrow definition that
tracks Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo’s careful and exacting
1
historical account of the topic. The only question at stake is whether, and to what extent, the President has the power to fire—delicately
referred to as the “power to remove”—officials within the executive
branch. Is that power one that can be exercised unilaterally and at
will, or is it one that can only be exercised for cause or with the concurrence of the legislative branch, or some portion thereof? Article
II does not address the endless permutations of removal, which are
difficult enough in connection with ordinary employment contracts
2
that are negotiated without any constitutional overlay. Instead, it only offers a skeletal account of the executive branch. The Vesting
Clause reads: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the
3
Term of four Years . . . .” The Take Care Clause provides that “he
4
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” In addition, Article II contains a provision detailing the process of appointment for
5
various public officials. As is typical, the Constitution contains no
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For this historical account, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008).
For my views on this question, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51
U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (examining the arguments for and against the contract at will
and defending it as intrinsically fair and mutually beneficial to employers and employees).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
Id. § 3.
See id. § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,
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definitions section that might shed light on these sparse provisions.
Their explication is left to judicial interpretation based, at least in
part, on common usage at the time. As is always the case in novel
ventures, the text is not sufficiently developed to resolve future legal
disputes.
More specifically, Article II contains one void that cannot be easily
filled. For all its attention to appointments, it does not contain a single word directed to the back end of the process: what powers does
the President have to remove various executive officials when they
clash with the President? A single sentence that provided that “the
President shall (not) be able to remove all superior and inferior offices in the executive branch at will” could have resolved this question
neatly, without appealing to the lofty reaches of political theory. Future generations could then decide whether the clear constitutional
design had withstood the test of time.
The absence of clear guidance thus transforms the rules governing removal of executive branch officials into a hotly contested matter of constitutional interpretation. That interpretive quest takes
place against the backdrop of textual provisions for a rigid separation
of powers that speaks in categorical terms about the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. These separate branches are not autarkic because the Constitution also imposes a rich set of checks and
balances that leave each branch autonomous in only some, but not
all, of their activities. The extensive application of these two constraints reflects a clear preference for limited government, which is
echoed in two other major constitutional themes: a federal system
with limited and enumerated powers, and a Bill of Rights that entrenches substantial constitutional protection for individual rights,
consistent with the theme of limited government, dealing with such
6
topics as property, contract, speech, and religion.

6

other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law,
or in the Heads of Departments.”).
For a discussion of a different constitutional structure, see Mark A. Graber, Enumeration
and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 357 (2007) (distinguishing between a formulation of well-designed governing
institutions and an affirmative enumeration of rights as methods of protecting against
government infringement upon fundamental liberties).
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Regrettably, that original Lockean preference has not survived the
7
constitutional transformations of the Progressive era. From the latenineteenth century through the advent of the New Deal, the Supreme Court was busily knocking down the barriers that stood in the
path of large government. On federalism, the key development was
the enormous expansion of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The early cases tended to exclude manufacture from
8
the scope of the Commerce Clause. During the New Deal era, the
clause was reinterpreted to allow extensive regulation of manufacture
9
and agriculture. By dint of hard labor, it has expanded to the point
10
where it now covers even solitary flies in isolated locales. One major
theme has been the rise of the rational basis test in economic affairs,
which renders off limits virtually any challenge to any general tax or
11
regulation that Congress or the states could devise, even as more
powerful protections remain in place against most, but by no means
12
all, government regulation of speech and religion. Big government
may not have been an original constitutional imperative, but it has
become a permanent feature of our political landscape. Today, there
is more business, for more permissible ends, at both the federal and
state levels.
These huge demands have taken their toll on the original constitutional understanding of the executive power which, in turn, has
placed real pressure on the President’s power to remove members of
the much-enlarged executive branch. This matter itself may look
small compared to the weighty issues of the distribution of powers be-

7
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For the transformation in connection with the nondelegation doctrine, see Douglas
Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
251 (2009).
See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (reasoning that Congress
lacks the power to regulate wholly intrastate manufacture of sugar under the Sherman
Antitrust Act since control of the manufacture of a good affects its disposition only incidentally and indirectly).
The key mileposts on that journey are Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942), which
upheld provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937), which upheld the National Labor Relations Act.
See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(upholding federal regulation of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly in the San Bernardino, California area under a very narrow reading of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995)).
See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227–28 (1986) (upholding a statute that retroactively removed exit rights to plan participants).
For one decision that reveals the tendency to allow progressive notions to justify the regulation of speech, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding Title I and II of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002).
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tween the Congress and the President over issues of war and peace,
yet the removal rules, although rarely dramatic, work in tandem with
other parts of the Constitution. There is little doubt that the resolution of this issue is both intertwined with other questions—for example, the scope of the delegation doctrine—and critical in its own right
of the day-to-day business of running a government. Let the ability of
the President to fire his officials be subject to senatorial (or even
congressional) approval, or otherwise limited in ways Congress specifies, and the balance of power shifts in favor of the legislature. Give
the President the power to fire at will, and the distribution of power is
more evenly balanced, because the Senate still has the power to deny
its approval to the new nominee, who may be needed to execute key
functions of government.
In order to get some handle on this complex set of issues, the remainder of this Article addresses two interrelated topics. In Part I, I
ask why the system of separation of powers needs to place some
strong limits on the presidential power to control operations within
the executive branch. In order to do this, I compare the presidential
system with two other organizations, one political and one not: the
former is the English parliamentary system, and the latter is the modern corporation. After this exposition, the second portion of the Article examines how this basic arrangement tends to fall apart as the
scale of government operations increases, leading to the rise of the
inelegant compromises of the administrative state. In order to make
good on this inquiry, it is necessary to move somewhat further afield,
for the operation of the removal power is dependent on a large range
of other topics, including the creation of the Article I courts, the establishment of independent administration agencies, and the operation of the nondelegation doctrine. In the end, I think that it is not
possible to attack the use of administrative agencies to the extent that
they engage in some cross between legislative and executive functions, but it is also unwise to allow independent administrative agencies to take on traditional judicial functions. Even at this late date, a
reversal of that portion of the New Deal constitutional order seems
appropriate.

13

For the textual tension, compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–18 (setting out the Congressional power with respect to war and peace), with id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (setting forth the
President’s power as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”).
For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia
Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317 (2005) (arguing that inflated claims for broad executive
power over issues of national security have no textual or historical justification).
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I. PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY AND CORPORATE SYSTEMS
It is a commonplace observation that there is much overlap between public and private systems of governance. In both settings, the
law of contract, insofar as it deals with simple bilateral transactions
like contracts of sale and hire, does not address the relevant issues:
simple exchanges of labor or property, without more, do not give rise
to government structures. But once parties to a voluntary agreement
seek to create long-term arrangements, they find that complete contingent state contracts cannot begin to do the job. In their place, governance mechanisms must be created to allocate power to make future decisions when a unanimity of opinion on key issues is known to
be unattainable. In this connection, the voluntary organizations in
corporate or charitable institutions offer a useful point of departure
for getting at the appropriate division of power in public organizations. Thus, the simple conveyance of a private home gradually gives
way to the complex governance structure of the subdivision, coopera14
tive, or condominium.
To be sure, there are systematic differences between these different types of organizations. All charitable and for-profit institutions
have the luxury of selecting their members by voluntary means.
Their greater internal coherence makes it possible for them to define
a mission on which members agree, both as to means and to ends.
While these organizations can develop deep fissures over their lifetimes, especially in the face of unforeseen circumstances that inevitably crop up in complex organizations, political organizations have
these tensions built in on the ground floor, because they must necessarily deal with the insistent claims of divergent groups that surely will
not see eye-to-eye on some questions. The need to include diverse
territories and groups leads, on average, to higher levels of heterogeneity in preferences, which can take ominous turns when the key divisions follow racial or ethnic lines. Both voluntary and political structures should rely on exit rights as a way to ease tension. Yet these are
generally more costly to exercise in a political setting, for individuals
cannot just resign their positions or sell shares to someone else; instead they must emigrate from the country, forced to leave their
homes and communities and to abandon lifelong associations, often
15
with no prospect of return. The combination of greater heteroge14
15

I trace this notion out in Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 906 (1988).
For a discussion of these issues, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 539–40 (1991)
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neity and less effective exit rights often leads to greater factional tension and dissension, which in turn requires that well-designed governments put into place more extensive and better articulated constitutional safeguards to combat the ever-present risks of faction and
intrigue. The private arrangements, therefore, do not offer a perfect
precedent to the nettlesome riddles of political organization, but they
still offer instructive analogies that it would be unwise to ignore.
It is therefore no surprise that in private associations and organizations, we see some elements that resonate in constitutional terms.
The most common features of these organizations is that they have a
board of directors that is responsible for setting policy and a chief executive officer (CEO) who is responsible for carrying out the directives of that board. That distinction is familiar to anyone who has
read the justification for this institutional arrangement in the Federal16
ist Papers. The board of directors, like the Congress, need not be in
constant session to do its work. It can meet and recess on a regular
basis, so that only a serious emergency requires it to be called back
into session—which is one of the powers afforded to the President by
17
the United States Constitution. That body, however, cannot handle
the day-to-day execution of the laws and cannot take direct responsibility for the persons who administer it. Those jobs are left to the
President.
But what governmental structures mediate the arrangement between these two branches? In most corporations, the salient feature
is that the CEO serves at the will of the board of directors, which can
remove him from office at any time and for any reason. That result
holds even in those cases where the nominal appointment is for a
term of years. That structural design matters, for unjust dismissal can

16
17

(describing limits on businesses’ and residents’ abilities to “exit” communities and insufficient constraints on municipal governments’ rent-seeking behavior). Note that exit
rights themselves are not guaranteed constitutionally, which limits the extent to which
they can function as a protector of other kinds of rights. See Richard A. Epstein, Exit
Rights and Insurance Regulation: From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 308–
11 (1999) (arguing that exit rights are necessary to constrain government action but have
no clear authority in the Federal Constitution).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying proposals to strengthen the
powers of the federal government under the Federal Constitution).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them . . . .”). It is also worth noting that the structure of the “Republican
Form of Government” clause alludes to this distinction at the state level. See id. art. IV, § 4
(“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against domestic Violence.”).
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lead to an obligation to pay the CEO and other high corporate officials compensation, perhaps in the form of a golden-parachute arrangement, to ensure that they step down from their positions with18
out a fight. But those compensation arrangements are details; what
really matters in this context are the structural issues. One wellestablished principle in American contract law is that employees do
not get the remedy of specific performance when dismissed from
19
their jobs. Courts uniformly and emphatically take the position that
they will not try to supervise the discretionary decisions that are always involved in employment contracts. Courts also bridle at the
thought that forced association on matters of fiduciary duties is an effective way to run a business. Indeed the only cases in which specific
performance—or, more accurately, reinstatement—is allowed are
under labor statutes where it is required precisely because the National Labor Relations Act imposes duties to bargain in good faith,
which themselves strip an employer of the ability to walk away from
20
the collective bargaining agreement without showing cause.
The decision to allow the board of directors to fire the CEO of any
voluntary organization shapes the operation of the organization from
top to bottom. Thus it is common in universities, for example, for
the president to have an absolute say on the selection of a provost
and of the deans of the key units. Similarly, in businesses, the CEO
can usually appoint or fire at will all members of the executive suite.
On these matters there may be some loose requirement for reporting
major changes that the CEO has made inside the organization to the
board, and it is often prudent for the president of the corporation or
charitable institution to consult with key board members before making that decision. But the decisions to appoint and fire are absolute
and are not subject to any formal kind of board control.

18

19

20

See, e.g., Eric Dash, Has the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C6
(describing high executive compensation awarded to CEOs who have resigned or been
fired); Gretchen Morgenson, The C.E.O.’s Parachute Cost What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007,
at C1 (discussing pressures to end shareholder reimbursements for CEO excise taxes paid
on executive compensation).
See, e.g., Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.) (denying specific performance of a labor contract but allowing an injunction against third party hiring). See
also N. Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431, 432 (Del. Ch. 1968) (denying specific performance of a complex building contract, by which it would “become
committed to supervising the carrying out of a massive, complex, and unfinished construction contract, a result which would necessarily follow as a consequence of ordering
defendant to requisition laborers as prayed for”).
See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (stating that an employer
is prohibited from “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees”).
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The reason for this distribution of power is clear. The ability of
the board to fire the CEO at will supplies sufficient control of all the
executive activities inside the corporation. Once the board fires one
CEO, it is in a position to appoint another on an interim or permanent basis, who has the exact same powers to hire and fire as the outgoing CEO. There is, therefore, no way that the outgoing CEO can
bind successors. Indeed, there is no way in which successful CEOs
can transfer their karma to their successors upon their retirement.
Hence, with a change in the guard, the only open question is whether
second-tier officials who are caught in the undertow are entitled to
some compensation by way of severance pay, which can be decided in
advance.
There are, of course, some instructive ambiguities in the role of
the corporate president. One major structural question is whether
the corporate president is also the chairman of the board, which
leads to greater integration between policy and execution but could
easily stifle the independence of the board precisely when it is
21
needed most. On this score, the general British preference—which
reflects the structure of their parliamentary institutions—is to have a
separate chairman of the board. The decided preference on the
American side, at least until recently, has been to make the CEO the
chairman of the board as well. So when ticklish issues of executive
performance arise, the remainder of the board has to meet by itself,
as it can do, to decide whether, how, and when to remove the CEO.
But for all these variations, the key design feature of this system is
that the CEO is given near-absolute power in the running of the
business precisely because he is subject to removal from office at the
pleasure of the board.
This system of private control is reflected in the British parliamentary system, where the Prime Minister has absolute control over the
members of his cabinet, subject, of course, to his own removal if he
loses a vote of confidence in Parliament or if he is voted out of office
in a public election. The close connection between the cabinet and
the Parliament creates an immediate need for a strong civil service to
provide continuity that is lacking with political change—a feature
that is also necessary in the American system due to its current massive proportions. But given the power of removing the Prime Minister, there is no elaborate system for the confirmation of new govern-

21

See, e.g., Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1159, 1175–79 (2005) (explaining reasons for SEC requirements to separate the role of
the CEO from the role of the Chairman of the Board).
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ment officials by the Parliament (or even one House), nor any say in
their removal. The entire process follows well-established and convenient corporate principles. Whatever differences emerge between
public and private institutions are taken into account elsewhere in
the parliamentary system.
On this account, enormous structural consequences attach to the
Founders’ decision to maintain a strict system of separation of powers, subject to appropriate checks and balances, as an indispensable
22
safeguard against tyranny. To make good on that agenda, it was
strictly necessary to build into the constitutional structure an independent executive branch headed by a President with a definite term
who is not answerable to Congress, except through impeachment, the
ultimate “for cause” dismissal that requires proof of the commission
of a high crime or misdemeanor before a Senate trial upon prosecution by the House of Representatives. As grounds for impeachment
are only rarely available, the necessity arises to develop some more
modest mechanisms to keep the President in line during his term of
office. Quite simply, absolute power does not mesh well with a protected four-year term. One possible approach, not taken by the federal Constitution, is to develop an unbundled executive, so that the
23
President has only some of the executive powers. This strategy is often adopted at the state level, where the Attorney General is inde24
pendent of the Governor.
There is little doubt that this division is the source of some profound consequences, as the investigative power of the Attorney General is often more aggressively pursued in these contexts. One need
think only of such notable (and controversial) Attorneys General as
Eliot Spitzer of New York to see how far this can go.
Whether this division of power makes sense is hard to say. It is
clear that part of the impulse for creating special prosecutors not subject to the direct control of the President rested on the perception
that presidential control over the office of the Attorney General
raised a conflict of interest that made it difficult to investigate poten-

22

23

24

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing that separation of powers requires
empowering the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to exercise constitutional
control over each other); see also GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE
FOUNDING PERIOD 1–22 (1997) (providing an overview of the separation of powers doctrine and arguing for its flexible application).
See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
1385, 1386 (2008) (theorizing that vesting various executive powers in several directly
elected executive officials would yield better-perfoming executives).
See id. (“Most states directly elect state attorneys general . . . .”).
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25

tial illegalities in the executive branch. Yet the failure of the institution of the Independent Counsel speaks of a second lesson, which is
that uncontrolled individuals holding investigative power could
themselves engage in abusive investigations as well, which, in large
measure, is why the office died for political reasons in 1999.
Yet historically, the American Constitution did not take that path.
Instead, it concentrated all executive power in a single official and, in
response, sought to build a structure that makes sensible adjustments
in order to take into account its novel vesting provisions. Its most
conspicuous feature is that the President is subject to limitations on
the content of his duty, that is, to take care that the law be faithfully
executed. Some instances require a performance, often discretionary, by other individuals in the executive branch—note the role of
the word “be” in this formulation—whose charges are given to them
by Congress, not by the President.
This formal limitation on presidential power is not easy to enforce
in light of the inevitable disputes of what is required by the law that
the President must execute. There are some black and white commands, but even before the rise of the modern administrative state,
government officials necessarily had to discharge discretionary functions. That was why Chief Justice Marshall took such pains to note in
Marbury v. Madison that the writ of mandamus did not apply to those
26
circumstances—a holding that remains good law to the present day.
Faced with the challenge of control, the Constitution veered off
into unexplored territory by introducing a powerful limitation: that
the President’s appointment of key senior officials must be approved
by the Senate—a restriction that is rejected in all corporate and parliamentary systems. A striking feature of this system of rejection is
that it is done through a straight majority vote. There is no “for
cause” requirement that the Senate must invoke to explain why it refuses to issue its consent. This is surely a commendable design feature given the initial structural decision to allow the President to
serve for a fixed term of four years. The Senate is a collective body

25

26

In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988), the Court upheld the constitutionality of
independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. Justice Scalia issued a prescient dissent, arguing that the provision violates the separation of powers doctrine by authorizing Congress to demand the Attorney General to investigate alleged executive branch misconduct. See id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress has effectively
compelled a criminal investigation of a high-level appointee of the President in connection with his actions arising out of a bitter dispute between the President and the Legislative Branch.”).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that courts do not have authority to question
how executive officers perform discretionary duties).
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and reasons that appeal to some members may not be persuasive to
others. Each Senator can speak his or her own piece on the subject
before or after the vote is taken. Any effort to cobble together some
public standard to decide the “for cause” question would fall prey to
the inanities of public deliberation by making it hard to reject someone without seeking to defame his character or fitness to serve as a
public official. Disagreements in policy are not precluded in this
context as a matter of law. The extent to which these are acted upon
by individual Senators, or indeed by the Senate as a whole, is a question for political wisdom—sometimes in short supply—and not for
legal oversight. The use of the advice and consent standard thus creates a wide space for soft institutional practices.
Nor is the American Constitution unique on this particularity.
The College of Cardinals also chooses the Pope by majority vote, cast
without explanation. The advantage of the President in any tug of
war with the Senate lies in his ability to win over enough members of
the Senate to have his way, no questions asked. Sooner or later the
positions will be filled, and, if not, the interim appointments are left
to the President, which gives him a not-so-subtle advantage over the
27
Senate.
This rigid system of senatorial approval applies only to senior officers of the government. As with all organizations, the question of
who fills the non-policy positions is far less weighty and, on this question, Congress is entitled to diminish the power of its Senate: “the
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers,
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
28
in the Heads of Departments.” It is worth noting that the relaxation
of control is not for the Senate to do on its own, but for both Houses
to accomplish together “by Law,” which is subject to the President’s
29
veto.
This cessation of power is not a one-way ratchet. Presumably, any
statute that offers power to the President could be repealed, subject
to a presidential veto and its override. In addition, these second-tier
appointments necessarily add an extra layer of complexity to the theory of the unitary executive. The Congress can choose to vest these

27

28
29

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall
expire at the End of their next Session.”).
Id. at cl. 2.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States . . . .”).
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30

powers in the heads of departments that can exercise them without
the approval or cooperation of the President, or in the courts that enjoy by design a very large measure of independence from the political
branches. This subappointment clause, as it were, thus permits the
Congress to dial up or dial down its powers relative to the other
branches. The mass of confirmations that is routinely required, and
often delayed, provides some evidence that Congress—or at least the
Senate—does not wish to surrender its power easily, even at the cost
of diminishing the effectiveness of key appointments who operate
31
only with provisional authority.
At the same time, the creation of an independent civil service that
is not answerable to the President fits only uneasily in the constitutional scheme, to say the least. The independence of the civil service
was stoutly defended by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States as a
correction against the “spoils system,” which allowed the victorious
candidate to displace all rank and file employees of the previous ad32
But that entire institutional arrangement, however
ministration.
wise, looks insecure when set against the constitutional text. The first
point of uncertainty is who counts as an “inferior officer.” The opposition to their “superior officers” (a term never used in the Constitution) seems clear enough. But the term “officer” itself suggests only a
subclass of all government employees who are not senior officials. By
way of analogy, the inferior officers of a corporation do not include
the receptionists or the custodial staffs, given their total absence of
33
policy-making functions. For those persons, it looks as though the
Appointments Clause has nothing to say at all, which leaves open the
question as to who exercises authority in the appointment and termination of executive branch employees who do not rise up to the level
of officers. On this question, the mystery only deepens when we look
at the matter through the lens of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
which grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be
30
31

32
33

Notably, no departments are specified by name in the Constitution.
For an exhaustive account of the difficulties in staffing key agency positions today, see
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 913 (2009) (noting the difficulties in filling the 1,100 positions that now require Senate confirmation in both the executive branch and independent agencies).
272 U.S. 52, 173–74 (1926) (defending the President’s unchecked power to remove civil
officers as being consistent with a merit system).
For a private law comparison, see Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2009) (“The term ‘officer’ shall mean an issuer’s
president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there is no such
accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), . . . or
any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer.”).
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necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern34
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”
This Clause clearly authorizes Congress to allow the President to
hire employees at all levels to staff the executive branch, for how else
could he discharge his duties? But it is a different question as to
whether it authorizes Congress to impose civil service requirements
on these employees, for it is far from apparent how these restrictions
work to assist the President “for carrying into Execution” any of his
constitutional powers. To the contrary, the Necessary and Proper
Clause looks to be a limitation on that ability, for why is it appropriate
for Congress to intrude in the internal affairs of the executive
35
branch? The expansive reading that is given to the Clause usually
relates to congressional powers to regulate or create, as it did with the
national bank at issue in McCulloch. That case did not involve congressional encroachment on the executive branch. At stake was “only” the expansion of federal powers relative to the states. But interbranch encroachment comes to the fore when the Necessary and
Proper Clause is invoked to rebalance powers between the branches
of the federal government.
Given that no enumerated power authorizes Congress to regulate
the internal affairs of the executive branch, just where does Congress
get the power to impose a civil service system on executive branch
operations? If anything, it looks as though there is an implicit congressional duty to authorize payment for (at least some) employees in
the executive branch, regardless of how the President chooses to organize it. After all, if Congress did not authorize the hiring of any
executive branch employees at all, the entire government could come
crashing down. Once again, the unarticulated gaps in the Constitution scheme loom as large as its explicit provisions, which is why a
36
close analysis leaves the Civil Service Act in some kind of structural
limbo, notwithstanding Chief Justice Taft’s protestations to the contrary. The lesson is clear: the harder we push on matters of government structure, the less guidance that we can wring out of the Consti34
35

36

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
The standard view of this clause is that “necessary and proper” should be translated as
“appropriate.” See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) (stating
that Congress was given powers that are “useful and appropriate” to enforce the specific,
articulated powers it was given). For a devastating critique, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B.
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 326–30 (1993) (stressing the word “proper” as a denial of delegated power).
Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (regulating the civil service of the United States).
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tution’s text. Chief Justice Taft carried the day not because of his superior textual arguments, but because his presidential aura legitimated the strong critique of the spoils system that led to the adoption
of the Civil Service Act. Such is the complexity of the underlying organizational problem that it is hard to make any confident global assessment about how well these reforms have fared.
Nor is there anything that dispels the murk when the discussion
turns to the status of the inferior officers. Although Congress has the
power to decide who shall make the appointment, the Constitution is
once again silent on the question of removal. If it is regarded as inherent in the President’s “take care” powers that he be able to remove his chief, or superior, officers at will, why does that removal
power not remain with the President, or the heads of the departments as the case may be, when legislation provides that Senate confirmation is not required? The case law on this subject emphatically
states that Congress can pass laws that require the Senate’s consent
37
for removal in these positions.
United States v. Perkins raised the question of whether the plaintiff,
a cadet engineer, could be dismissed by the Secretary of the Navy
38
when his services were no longer required. Perkins explicitly passed
on the question of whether the Senate could restrict the removal of
officers who were appointed only with its advice and consent, and
continued as follows:
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment
of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict
the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed.
The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by
such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments
39
but in all that is incident thereto.

This argument relies heavily on the greater/lesser power argument that works well in ordinary business situations: the power to
decide whether or not to make an offer gives the offeror the power to

37
38
39

See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (holding that Congress has
constitutional authority to regulate the removal of inferior officers).
Id. at 483.
Id. at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at
214–15 (asserting that the holding of Perkins “makes eminent good sense as applied to the
removal power of heads of departments”).
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40

impose conditions on that offer. Without this principle, it is not
possible to develop ordinary commerce in competitive markets. But
by the same token, this full-throated version of freedom of contract
does not work where either private parties or governments exercise
monopoly power, as they so often do. The power to exclude from the
roads does not include the lesser power to reserve their use only to
Republicans or Democrats, men or women, even if it does allow the
state to require parties to a road accident to submit to its resolution
41
within the jurisdiction where it takes place. And the same set of implicit limitations apply to structural issues. The power to confirm or
reject a nominee to the Supreme Court, for example, does not confer
on the Senate the power to appoint a nominee to that seat on condition that he or she refuse to participate in antitrust or affirmative action cases. Repeated application of conditional approvals will gut the
operational capacities of any appointment. The decision is necessarily an all-or-nothing choice, for otherwise the separation of powers is
at an end.
That same risk of interbranch encroachment arises in Perkins. It
makes no sense to hold that Congress, through legislation, cannot
limit the President’s power of removal for officers that are appointed
through the confirmation process, but that it can (even over a presidential veto) prevent the President and his key appointees from removing at will inferior employees without the consent of the Senate,
or indeed the House of Representatives as well. Congress’s ability to
either allow or force the President to make appointments without
Senate confirmation does not allow Congress to strip him of the power of removal of inferior officers, whose cooperation is needed to
make the executive branch respond to his wishes. There is no apparent reason why Congress can unilaterally increase its powers at the
back end by reducing them at the front.
It is no response, moreover, to say that the removal power does
not matter because the decisions of inferior officers can generally be
overridden by their superior officers through the normal chain of
command. That claim is idle when an inferior officer is entitled to
keep his post, as in Perkins. Nor does that response address the situation where Congress vests particular powers in discrete officers within
the executive branch other than the President. It has long been settled, for example, that the Congress may pass legislation that confers

40

For my extensive discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE
(1993).

41

See generally id. at 161–70.
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certain powers on the Secretary of the Treasury that the President
cannot exercise in his personal capacity. Thus in the famous dispute
over the Bank of the United States, President Andrew Jackson did not
have the power to withdraw federal funds from the Bank; nor did he
have the power to order the Secretary of the Treasury to do so. But
he did have the power to remove any Secretary of Treasury who refused to do so, and to appoint, but only with the advice and consent
of the Senate, someone else to do his bidding. Accordingly, Jackson
fired first Louis McLane and then William Duane before he ap42
pointed Roger Taney, who was prepared to do his bidding. Against
that backdrop it seems highly unlikely that Congress would vest powers in inferior officers in ways that bypass the President altogether. It
is almost a contradiction in terms to say that neither the President
nor any of his senior officers are empowered either to give direct orders to subordinates or to remove them from office, without the consent of the Senate, or even the entire Congress. Any purported insulation of so-called inferior officers counts as a complete inversion of
the constitutional hierarchy that subordinates key aspects of executive power to the will of Congress. If Congress wants to reassert some
control over inferior officials, let it repeal any legislation that allows
these appointments to be made by the senior executive branch officials acting on their own. Otherwise the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, which emerged after Perkins was decided, undermines the
soundness of that decision.
II. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM
Thus far I have concentrated on the role of the removal power in
its relationship to the appointment power of the President under the
original constitutional design. The second part of the problem asks
how well the unitary executive survives in modern times. At this
point, the issue is not one of textual interpretation of the key points
in Article II. Rather the issue is what pressures are placed on the removal power against the background of other major changes in our
constitutional system wrought during and since the tumultuous
1930s. On this score, it is quite clear that modern times demand,
42

For discussion, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705–07 (2007). I think that Strauss overreads this
history in thinking that it supplies any textual support for the constitutional legitimacy of
independent agencies. See Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Inconsistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491, 503 (2008) (“The creation of the
independent administrative body . . . will increase the size and power of the administrative state in ways that classical liberals would find unacceptable.”).
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even in the most modest of circumstances, a size of the federal government far larger and more complex than any contemplated by the
Framers. Simple increases in population and in the number of states
are themselves sufficient to drive that result. And these effects are in
turn compounded by the huge expansion in the scope of federal
power through the New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause.
These changes matter because the Constitution does not create a
set of institutional arrangements for allocating federal authority that
are easily scalable. It is not as though all of the basic relationships in
the original Constitution remain constant when the government it
creates repeatedly doubles and redoubles in size. Stated otherwise,
what might be an efficient distribution of power for a small government turns out to be an overrigid distribution of power for an expanded state. As constitutional amendments are hard to come by,
the adjustments in question are made by judicial accommodations
that sometimes make sense, but sometimes do not. To show this
problem, it is worthwhile to take a small digression to deal with one
issue at the line between congressional and executive power, which is
the impeachment process within Congress, where the scale issues
have imposed stress on the original constitutional framework. Thereafter, it is useful to see how the problem of expanded government
size and mission puts added stress on the original system of separation of powers, all of which deal with various questions of delegation
that increase the number of ways in which the federal government
can act. Some of these involve delegations of powers to Article I
courts and to administrative agencies. The former does not properly
speaking involve the executive branch, but it must be explored as a
counterpoint to the key issue on executive power, namely the delegation of authority to administrative agencies, which manifestly does.
Thereafter, the analysis concludes with a discussion of congressional
delegations to the President, in order to develop some working explanation of the distribution of issues between the executive branch
proper and the independent administrative agencies.
A. Impeachment
The practices governing impeachment offer an instructive way to
look at the scale problem. When the legislature has few matters to
consider, members of the House and Senate can make a pretense of
keeping up with the work. But as the number of matters increase, it
becomes ever more necessary to reduce the amount of work that is
done by each house as a whole and, necessarily, to increase the
amount of work that is delegated first to committee, and then to
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committee staffers. In many instances, this process simply looks like a
reorganization of workload that was contemplated by the Constitution, which wisely left each house the master of its own internal governance. But in some instances, the efforts at delegation run up
against constitutional limitations. Thus on matters of impeachment
of judicial officials, for example, one question is whether the trial has
to be before the Senate as a whole. The text itself provides that:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds
43
of the Members present.

The common procedure today in routine impeachments for federal judges is to allow the heavy work to be decided by a committee,
which then refers the matter out to the full Senate for a vote. But this
hardly seems to meet the standards set out in the Constitution, for
the Senate does not seem to be “sitting for that Purpose” when many
of its members are excluded from the deliberations. The last sentence of this Clause does not require every Senator to be present, requiring that the impeachment takes place with the concurrence of
the vote of two thirds of present members (which means that staying
away in protest reduces the number of votes needed to secure the
conviction). Yet by the same token, the sentence seems to suggest
that all Senators have the right to be present, which is not the case
when the initial vetting of the case is reserved to a committee. The
same conclusion comes from an ordinary reading of the term “try.” A
court would not be sitting for the purposes of a case if most of the
judges who were responsible for issuing its ruling never heard the
oral argument. Only in very limited circumstances can appellate
judges participate in cases where they were not present at oral argument. And it is unheard of to allow district court judges to try cases
in absentia. So it looks as though all Senators should have the right
to participate in the proceedings.
That system, which might have worked well with thirty Senators
and modest amounts of business, is not likely to work at all today. So
when the issue came to a head in Nixon v. United States, the Supreme
44
Court solemnly pronounced the matter a political question, which
was a polite way of saying that, on this occasion at least, it adopted the
narrow view of Marbury v. Madison, under which the Court would not

43
44

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) (“Judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if
only for purposes of judicial review, is counterintuitive . . . .”).
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interfere with the internal operations of a coordinate branch of gov45
ernment. In this instance, the strategy of nonintervention worked
well, because once the impeachment is done with, its results do not
influence any structural interaction with the two other branches of
government. But for a conscientious Senator, nothing turns on the
refusal of the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of the phrase
“try impeachment;” it does not end the inquiry into the constitutionality of the Senate’s procedures, which should have led to the same
interpretive result: the Senate has to sit as a court of the whole to
hear the case. But the functional arguments proved in the end too
strong as the full Senate cannot operate coherently in that manner,
constantly forcing matters on lesser bodies. The modern practice
should sit well for functionalists, but not for originalists, and for the
same reason. We have here a set of changed circumstances, without
any obvious political valence, that renders the older procedures suspect precisely because they are not scalable.
The same kind of issue applies with respect to the executive
branch, which under the current Constitution is asked to discharge
countless tasks that were not in the contemplation of the Framers.
The vast increase in the scale of its operation requires a huge expansion in its personnel, and a concomitant increase in the level of discretion it exercises. Cabining the executive branch in its original
form would therefore impose enormous span of control problems on
its operation. If the executive were to implement the broad mandates characteristic of the welfare state, it would also work to increase
the power of the President vis-à-vis the Congress. Indeed, in large
part the creation of independent agencies, which are said to fall within the executive branch, was an effort to prevent that shift in power
by limiting the power of the President to remove agency members
from office without some showing of cause.
Historically, these tensions manifested themselves in connection
with the organization of the judicial power. On this score, the battleground is set by the explicit provisions of Article III that stipulate that
all federal judges shall have lifetime tenure—technically on good behavior—and that their salary cannot be diminished within their term
46
of office. It takes little imagination to realize that even as the base of
the pyramid continues to expand almost without end, the top of the
pyramid consists of one Supreme Court that cannot keep up with the
volume of work below, no matter how energetic it becomes. Yet there

45

See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

46

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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is real resistance to following the practices of other courts, which
would allow the Supreme Court (at least in nonconstitutional cases)
to sit in panels, for fear that the composition of the panel will have a
powerful influence on the direction of the law. These immense practical pressures are born, in part, of deep structural transformations
and in equal measure of short-term political concerns.
It is no mystery why the entire enterprise is fraught with such difficulty. Figuring out these twists and turns with the creation of such
constitutional oxymorons as independent agencies in the executive
branch that are “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” is the next task
47
of this Article. The first section traces the expansion of the government powers at state levels to set the stage for the similar transformation at the federal level. Thereafter, it is necessary to look at relations
across all three branches to develop some understanding of the transformation of the position of the executive, and the unilateral power
of removal. The second section then examines the complexities of
the commission model at the federal level in connection with both
Article I courts and independent agencies, and concludes with a discussion of the complex interactions between Congress and the executive branch.
B. State and Federal Commissions
The structure of expanded government is not unique to the federal level, for a parallel expansion in government also took place at
the state level, whose actions were unencumbered by the limitations
found in the federal constitution. As the states expanded their activities in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they relied
on a wide range of new and specialized institutions. These actions
did not go unopposed. Perhaps the most famous example of judicial
48
resistance was Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co., which represented a
confused effort to invoke common law notions of tort liability to
strike down the initial New York Workmen’s Compensation Act under state constitutional law. The New York statute in its original form
did not make use of any specialized commission to hear these cases,
49
so that the case raised no structural issues at the state level. These
47

48
49

These terms are found in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which
described the FTC as “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial
and quasi-legislative.” Id. at 624.
94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911).
See New York Labor Law of 1910, art. 14a, § 219d, quoted in Ives, 94 N.E. at 435 (stating
that a dispute over workers’ compensation could be settled through the common law
court system).
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objections largely rested on uneasiness with the displacement of the
traditional common law standards of liability. New York promptly
amended its constitution to allow for this innovation, which was
promptly challenged under the United States Constitution, where it
was upheld against takings and due process challenges in New York
50
Central Railroad Co. v. White.
White had nothing to say about the use of specialized compensation commissions at the state level. That structural question surfaced
in 1932 when the constitutionality of the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act came before the Supreme Court in
51
Within our system of federal powers, could a
Crowell v. Benson.
workmen’s compensation commission be established to decide these
cases? The federal challenge was whether the Act conferred judicial
power on a nonjudicial body. The early learning on this subject appeared to state that all judicial powers had to remain with the courts,
52
and no other powers could be conferred on them. To be sure, by
the time Crowell was decided, the austere regime of Murray’s Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. had already been eroded with the
inexorable expansion of the administrative state. Murray’s Lessee had
recognized a limited exception to its sharp departmentalism in cases
of “[e]quitable claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territo53
ries,” which is best explained by the highly politicized nature of any
dispute that necessarily involves land titles derived from grants by the
54
United States.
By 1932, however, the definition of a public right had expanded
to accommodate the reality of the new administrative state. Crowell
involved a specialized federal workmen’s compensation scheme.
Chief Justice Hughes’s rationale for sustaining these commissions
had no modest goal: it was intended to legitimate the full range of
specialized institutional arrangements that had developed since the

50
51
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243 U.S. 188, 209 (1917) (holding that the exclusive workers’ compensation system created under the New York Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1913 was constitutional).
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284
(1856) (“To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state
that we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from
its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.”).
Id.
For such a case, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). The case cited in
Murray’s Lessee was Foley v. Harrison, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 433 (1853), which involved grants
of federal lands to each of the states for internal improvements. See Murray’s Lessee, 59
U.S. at 284.
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passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, including, most notably, the Interstate Commerce Commission. Public rights thus included such matters as “foreign commerce, taxation, immigration,
the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pen55
sions and payments to veterans.”
All of these issues could be
brought before administrative tribunals without question. But the
ordinary workers’ compensation dispute turned on money owed for
workplace injuries, which could not simply be removed from the Article III courts by fiat. At this point, Chief Justice Hughes adopted an
inelegant compromise whereby the basic jurisdictional facts in any
admiralty case—did the dispute occur at a location covered by courts
of admiralty, and was the accident one that arose out of the course of
that admiralty jurisdiction?—were subject to de novo review in federal court. On the other hand, questions on the extent of injury and
level of compensation could be decided exclusively within the commission because no jurisdictional issues were implicated.
It is important to recall how this hairsplitting came to pass by reverting to the basic issue of the tripartite constitutional structure in a
world where the effectiveness of the judicial system is heavily dependent on size. When the public administrative load is small, separation
of powers works pretty well. But the huge expansion in government
power makes it hard to ramp up the system to meet the additional
load. Commissions are a sensible way of getting many of the cases out
of the judicial system. The logic for doing this within the framework
of the federal government is equivalent to the logic for doing it
within the states. And once the states took that path, why deny that
option to the federal government? As the size of the federal district
courts expands, the pressure rises to expand the size or number of
the courts of appeals. But there is no similar adjustment at the top,
as the number of Supreme Courts is frozen at one, no matter how
may rivers feed into it.
On this point, the stakes in Crowell were in fact higher than the
new compensation commissions due to two other noteworthy developments. The first of these is the rise of Article I courts, in which
some element of the judicial power is vested in judges who do not
have life tenure and who cannot, therefore, be located in Article III
courts. Tax court and bankruptcy court judges fall under that description and their appointments are for long, but limited, terms—

55

Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
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fifteen years for the tax court and fourteen years for the bankruptcy
court. The second concerns the rise of independent administrative
agencies that fit nowhere within the current tripartite system.
C. Article I Courts
The United States Tax Court began life as the U.S. Board of Tax
57
Appeals under the Revenue Act of 1924. Its creation was marked by
a sustained terminological effort to insulate these courts from constitutional attack. That is why the Tax Board of Appeals was originally
staffed with “members,” not “judges”—a state of affairs that lasted un58
til the Revenue Act of 1942, which upgraded the low-status Board
into the Tax Court of the United States, whose members were upgraded to “judges,” and whose chairman became the “Presiding
Judge.”
The Bankruptcy Courts also traveled on a long and complex path,
59
culminating in the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act created the new office of bankruptcy refe60
ree. These referees were appointed by district court judges and
served for two-year terms, subject to removal at any time. Referees
had final word on administrative matters, but their substantive decisions were subject to review by the district court judges who appointed them. By 1946, their term of office had extended to six
years, and the transformation to bankruptcy judges was completed in
the 1978 Reform Act, when the traditional administrative functions
were split off and turned over to the Department of Justice.
The 1978 Bankruptcy Act was conscious of the Article I difficulty,
which it sought to meet as follows. For the core functions of bankruptcy, broadly defined, the only appeal from a bankruptcy court is to
the courts of appeals. Noncore functions are subject to de novo review in the district courts on the theory that, historically, they have no

56
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See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336. The difference between a tribunal and court is that tribunals are usually charged with adjudication for some specific
incident only, after which they are disbanded.
Id.
Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 957.
See generally Prudence Beatty Abram & Andrew DeNatale, From Referee in Bankruptcy to
Bankruptcy Judge: A Century of Change in the Second Circuit, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF
BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE
UNITED STATES 61 (U.S. Courts for the Second Circuit Comm. on History & Commemorative Events ed., 1995); Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Judicial History: Bankruptcy Referees,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/referees_bdy (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).
Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 1, § 1(a)(21), 30 Stat. 544, 545.
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special expertise that justifies their elevation to Article I status. The
direct de novo review in district court shows the influence of Crowell,
because an Article III court would be able to review the entire matter.
The fix should not work, given that bankruptcy courts also discharge
a wide array of functions that normally fall to courts of first instance
under Article III.
It is understandable, therefore, that the 1978 Act was held unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
62
Co. Textually, it is hard to find a principled defense of these oxymoronic Article I courts. The ostensible authority for creating these
bodies is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, which gives Congress
the power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”
The term “tribunal” appears only in one place in the Constitution,
where it assumes a critical role. The basic structure of Article III calls
for the creation of the Supreme Court. It also allows for the creation
of whatever inferior courts the Congress shall ordain and establish.
Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 authorizes Congress to create those
courts. Without it, Congress does not have any explicit power in Article I to fill out the federal system. To the extent, therefore, that this
provision is the only source of legislative authority for creating tax or
bankruptcy courts, it gives no shelter to those who want to free these
courts from the restrictions found in Article III.
To be sure, the term “tribunal” sometimes refers in popular
speech to bodies that are brought into existence to deal with some
short term problem, after which they are disbanded. One such body
was the War Claims Commission, formed in 1948 to deal with compensation claims for internees, prisoners, and religious organizations
at the conclusion of World War II. That Commission had to wrap up
63
its business within three years after the close of its filing period.
This Commission (which does not use the word “tribunal”) has the
twin hallmarks of limited duration and specialized docket. In these
cases, an argument can be made that the commission “members”—a
replay of the verbal strategy adopted with the Board of Tax Appeals—
need not be federal judges with lifetime tenure. It can be persons
who are appointed by the President (and in the case of the War
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For discussion of the structure of bankruptcy law, see Chapter 1 of DOUGLAS G. BAIRD,
THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (rev. ed. 1993).
458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
See War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1240, 1241 (“The Commission shall
wind up its affairs at the earliest practicable time after the expiration of the time for filing
claims, but in no event later than three years after the expiration of such time.”).
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Claims Commission, confirmed by the Senate) for the duration of the
Commission itself.
These specialized commissions were, and are, created in response
to a serious peak-load problem. It is unwise to appoint lots of additional federal judges to handle this overload when the burden will be
over in a couple of years. It does not follow, however, that there is no
restraint on the staffing of these bodies. It would have been unacceptable, for example, to allow the appointment of commissioners for
one-year terms, subject to renewal, given the obvious threat to judicial
independence. That said, it is hard to shoehorn either the tax or the
bankruptcy courts into any narrow short-term tribunal exception to
lifetime tenure for federal judges, assuming that it properly exists.
The brute fact is that both courts are a permanent feature of our judicial landscape. Once any tribunal becomes perpetual, terminology
does not matter: the terms of its judges or members should be for
life under Article III. Otherwise, district courts could have their work
siphoned off into tribunals until the requirements of Article III become a dead letter, as we have specialized bodies to deal with government claims, patents, copyrights, condemnations, communications, labor, and so on down the line.
As an originalist matter, therefore, the answer seems clear: we
cannot have these specialized tribunals exist outside of Article III.
But there they sit, and the question to ask is whether the harm is so
great that one should seek to undo the damage. On this score, some
weight has to be attached to the soundness of the initial provision
and the nature of the subsequent incursion. Instructively, Article I
judges are all guaranteed their compensation during their term of office, and for obvious reasons. The sticking point involves de facto life
tenure for federal judges on good behavior. The Constitution incorporated this provision, like the compensation provision, in order to
ensure the independence of judges from encroachment by the other
two branches. That end is highly laudable, but the constitutional
choice of means has turned out to be, in my judgment, highly flawed.
Not surprisingly, it has been subject to all sorts of powerful criticisms
64
and evasions. Life tenure allows senile judges to sit on the court in
their dotage, and it goes against the principle of rotation which
brings fresh blood into public offices. A system that allowed judges to
work until some specified retirement age—say, seventy years of age—
64

For some sense of the widespread dissatisfaction with the current system, see Terri L. Peretti, Promoting Equity in the Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments, in REFORMING THE
COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 435 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D.
Carrington eds., 2006).
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or which restricts them to long-term appointments—say, fifteen
years—goes a long way to preserve independence while avoiding the
risks associated with (de facto) lifetime tenure.
It is, of course, no accident that many state courts have moved to
systems of this sort. And it is no quiet irony that the maximum age
limit for state court judges has been subject to the (dubious) claim
65
that it violates the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
At bottom, however, imposing term limits for these other judges
counts as an unambiguous improvement on the original constitutional
scheme, which now comes at the price of doctrinal impurity. But no
one claims that these developments create systemic risks, even if they
oppose the division across different classes of federal judges, given
the high level of independence that these judges retain.
D. Independent Agencies
Side by side with the rise of Article I judges is the validation of independent administrative agencies whose members do not serve at
the will of the President. The use of administrative agencies started,
of course, with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887,
but the issue did not come to a head in the Supreme Court until the
66
decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States. In 1914, Congress established the Federal Trade Commission as part of Woodrow Wilson’s
67
general reform efforts to control “unfair methods of competition.”
The members of that panel were removable only for-cause, or more
68
precisely, “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
Justice Sutherland upheld the statutory language, distinguishing
Myers on the ground that it dealt with “purely executive officers,” and
thus did not extend to FTC Commissioners who are not executive
department officials at all, but who act “quasi-legislatively and in part
69
quasi-judicially.” So the question then arises, just where are they located? If they are not executive branch officials, then by elimination
they must belong to either the legislative or judicial branch. Yet both
of these suggestions can be dismissed out of hand. Administrators
have not been elected to their offices, and are not members of the
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69

See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 484–85 (1991) (holding that the ADEA did not
bind the states with respect to its own employees in the absence of a clear statement to
that effect). For my defense of that position, see Richard A. Epstein, Mandatory Retirement
for Supreme Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 64, at 415.
295 U.S. 602 (1935).
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
Id. § 4l.
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627–28.
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House or Senate. And they are certainly not judges with lifetime tenure. So we thus created a fourth branch of government, with no constitutional pedigree to handle the distinctive mixture of duties of an
FTC commissioner. Yet once the dam breaks, imitation follows as a
matter of course. Thus, for example, the National Labor Relations
Act created a board of three members, serving for a term of five years
70
each, with its chairman designated by the President.
As an originalist matter, the case against independent administrative agencies is at least as strong as the case against Article I judges:
neither has a constitutional home. It might be tempting, therefore,
to assume that whatever historical arguments give a free pass to Article I judges today should do the same for administrative agencies.
But here, as elsewhere, this originalist approach faces the same difficulty of whether long usage should insulate the practices from constitutional review. The faint-hearted would surely say yes, on the
grounds that the entire administrative state is equally entrenched,
and agencies perhaps more so than Article I courts. Indeed giving
life time tenure to Article I judges would create only a small dent in
the current judicial structure. The same could hardly be said with respect to legitimating independent administrative agencies.
My own view, however, is that it is both desirable and possible to
strip the independent agencies of their adjudicative functions. There
is a lot of evidence which suggests that independent administrative
agencies behave for most purposes like executive branch agencies in
71
the way in which they issue regulations and make policy. Even most
scholars cannot remember from one end of the day to another which
agencies are located in the executive branch and which are independent. But all that counts for naught on the question of whether
the judicial functions of these agencies have substitute or substantial
safeguards for judicial independence that remotely resemble those
built in on the ground floor for Article III courts. The answer to that
question has to be an unambiguous no. The FTC could still promulgate rules and initiate enforcement proceedings. And the NLRB
could still oversee union recognition elections and investigate unfair
labor practices. But the adjudication of its claims should be turned
over to Article III (or even Article I) courts.
Two points—one clear and one less so—shape the discourse. The
first involves the use of specialized administrative agencies with cer70
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29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (Supp. I 1935). The number of members of the NLRB was increased
to five by the Labor Management Relationship (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80101, 61 Stat. 136.
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 42, at 704–05.
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tain well-defined subject matter areas—labor, securities, telecommunications. In one sense, this level of specialization is identical to that
which is found with tax and bankruptcy court. But is that formal parallelism sufficient to acquit the independent agencies on this score?
To that, the answer is surely no. The choice between Article I courts
and independent agencies is not randomly made. Much depends on
the perceived nature of the issue that is likely to arise within these two
fora. Bankruptcy and taxation do raise their fair share of hot button
issues, for example, but few of those issues arise in the day-to-day application of the law, which deals largely with technical matters on
which there are few political differences. Not so with the other three
areas, where deep political issues are built into the agency jurisdiction. The struggles between management and labor bear no documentation on the level of class conflict. The allocation of licenses
under the FCC gives rise to extensive political debate over all sorts of
hot button issues relating to program content, affirmative action, and
diversity. Securities law often pits small investors against large corporations and asks fundamental questions about the viability of unregulated capital markets. The clear subject matter in these agencies tip
off the President and Congress of the anticipated orientation of potential appointees on these matters. The appointments process is not
subject to the kind of drag that arises with appointments to courts of
general jurisdiction, where it is much more difficult to pigeon hole
nominees to the President’s personal satisfaction on a wide array of
issues. The judge whose views you like on national security is the
judge you fear on antitrust—yet the two distinct persona are bound at
the hip in any court of general jurisdiction. Those connections are
severed with respect to administrative agencies.
So, true to form, it is no accident that the appointive process takes
on a different form. The Securities and Exchange Act makes explicit
the political valence. Section 4(a) states:
There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Commission’) to be composed of five commissioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. Not more than three of such commissioners shall
be members of the same political party, and in making appointments
members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as
72
nearly as may be practicable.

For its part, the NLRA calls for five-year terms for its members (who
are not judges, of course), the Chairman of which is appointed by the
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73

President. But it is for good reason that the three-two split is observed in its actions, given the deep political splits on substantive issues. The needed matching of board members has the unfortunate
side effect of creating log jams at renewal, for the entire operation is
an elaborate ritual of pairing up the appointees from both sides in
package deals such that the Democrat will not get appointed unless
his or her Republican is appointed as well. As the level of conflict increases, the appointment process effectively stalls. As of this writing
the NLRB has had only two members, Wilma Liebman, Chairman,
and Peter C. Schaumber, member, which is the minimum quorum by
which it can do work. The compromise intensifies the level of partisanship to far greater heights than in the federal courts, where the
recent spate of empirical evidence notes some modest level of political disagreement, which in routine cases may be less significant than
74
meets the eye.
In this context, it makes little sense to overrule Humphrey’s Executor
and make these commissioners subject to the removal power of the
President. That situation would be wholly intolerable given the partisan nature of the divisions over the judicial portions of their workload. The only argument is that, faced with this risk, a sensible Congress might jettison the scheme altogether. But that result would not
happen so long as the President and Congress are controlled by the
same party, as is the case today. So it would be a classic illustration of
jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. The manifest risks of partisanship and intrigue are so evident that any serious constitutional
inquiry should not immunize the independent agency model from
scrutiny on the basis of the long passage of time. As urged earlier,
the Article I court alternative is clearly preferable for the judicial
functions of these agencies, whose wings should be clipped by the
Supreme Court if necessary.
E. Delegations to the Executive Branch
This piece of the puzzle involves the delegations that Congress
makes to the executive, knowing, of course, that within limits the
President does possess the right to remove key officials at will. At this
73
74

29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (Supp. I 1935).
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: THEORETICAL AND QUANTITATIVE
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming). For an empirical review, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE
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juncture, Congress faces the issue with which this paper began. What
institutional structures should be introduced to offset the advantage
that the President has with a fixed four year term? The doctrinal lens
through which this problem is approached is the so-called “nondelegation” rule, which is a modern application of the Latin maxim delegatus non potest delegare: the delegatee is a person who is not allowed
to delegate further. This maxim has its start in the private law and its
power can be seen in connection with the usual situation in contract
law, which is receptive to the assignment of rights but suspicious of
the delegation of duties. In its simplest incarnation, delegation of a
duty to pay carries with it a huge default risk that is not found in connection with the assignment of the right to collect. And with service
obligations, the famous painter cannot delegate his duty to paint a
portrait to his callow apprentice, unless he first obtains the consent of
the other party. All of these rules are, at bottom, default rules so that
contracts can be drafted to either expand or contract delegation.
The cases in which these risks are ignored in explicit contracts are
few and far between.
The public law context raises somewhat different issues on structural matters because in these cases the limitations should be re75
garded as impervious to political agreement. That point dates back
to Locke, who wrote:
[T]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands;
for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it
cannot pass it over to others. . . . The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can
be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to
76
transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.

That attitude surely worked its way into our constitutional tradition, with its Lockean impulse to protect wherever possible the public
at large from government intrigue. One corollary is that any agreement between the President and the Congress, even if unanimous,
which would let the President do what he will under a statute that essentially allows him to rule by decree, is surely out of bounds. This is
yet another application of the basic principle that freedom of contract among current holders of various public offices can never be al-
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There are clearly here shades of the structural application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY: PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 38–74
(5th ed. 2002) (surveying the nondelegation doctrine).
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 81 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal
Arts Press 1952) (1690) (emphases added).
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lowed to undo the structural limitations that the Constitution imposes on the three branches of government.
This extreme case has never come up because Congress has its
own institutional bailiwick to protect against the President, which
makes it difficult to persuade it to grant him such power. At this
point, the interpretive question is how to treat these political safeguards. On the one hand, it could be said that hard cases test the
principle, and so long as government by presidential decree is within
limits, the delegation doctrine has teeth. The opposite position asks,
why introduce a doctrine that will have some teeth and then figure
out how to allow the major delegations to the executive branch to
take hold.
The fruit of this deliberation is less than ideal, for it yields the
principle that the Congress can delegate to the executive branch
what it wants, so long as there is some “intelligible principle” that go77
verns the delegation. That principle carries with it little weight in
practice, so that delegations are routinely sustained today. But here
again, the political economy story cannot be ignored, for the key
question is why delegate key tasks to the executive agencies, where
the President enjoys the removal power over subordinates, rather
than to independent agencies, where he does not? The answer to
that question comes, I believe, in a set of straightforward strategic
choices. The independent agency, with its so-called institutional safeguards, will be used in those cases where permanent bodies are
needed to implement complex policies. The Congress that creates
these delegations needs to be sure that the President—not just the
current occupant, but his successors—will not neutralize its program
by hiring and firing his own people. The level of residual discretion
thus invites Congress to hedge its bets. It knows that it cannot churn
out the volume of work itself. It wants to take steps to see that the
delegation does not give excessive power to the President, who could,
under the guise of interpretation, undo the agency’s central mandates.
But the strategic calculus changes with respect to short-term delegations. The key exemplar on this point is A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
78
Corp. v. United States, which struck down a delegation of authority to
the President to create codes of “fair competition” under the (ghastly) provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933. Chief
77
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For the recent statement on this point, see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531
U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (rejecting the view that “an agency can cure an unconstitutionally
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295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Justice Hughes wrote a learned opinion, in which he professes immense difficulty in defining what is meant by “fair competition” un79
der the Act. And he was troubled in this effort because he knew well
that the Federal Trade Commission received quasi-legislative and
quasi-judicial powers to declare unlawful various acts of unfair competition, all of which were undefined. How does one keep one statute constitutional and not the other? This is a good question, to
which Chief Justice Hughes’s decision in Schechter offers no acceptable answer. And the mystery deepens because Justice Cardozo rose
up on his common law haunches to denounce a statutory scheme
80
that tolerates “delegation running riot” to the President.
What on earth were they talking about? The initiatives of the National Industrial Recovery Act were not chump change:
In the course of its short life from August, 1933, to February, 1935, the
Administration formulated and approved 546 codes and 185 supplemental codes filling 18 volumes and 13,000 pages; 685 amendments and modifications to these codes. It issued over 11,000 administrative orders interpreting, granting exemptions from, and establishing classifications
81
under the provisions of individual codes . . . .

This was no small time operation.
And where was Congress during all this? Happy as a clam. The
cartel-du-jour model had swept the land, and that model is what the
President implemented. The genius of the legislative provision was to
prevent monopolies: “[t]hat such code or codes shall not permit
82
monopolies or monopolistic practices.” So it looks like the free
market is in action, until you read the entire Act. The codes are
submitted by “one or more trade or industrial associations or
83
groups.” The bottom line: no to single monopolies, yes to cartels.
And these cartels would be spread out across the United States, creating an extensive membership base that was the source of large levels
of political support for the program. The effective restraint left to
Congress was, moreover, as simple as it was effective. Moreover, the
84
entire program was limited to a two-year period. The length of operation was not ambiguous, so there is little risk of judicial nullification of the provision. Once the original term expired, or even before, Congress could have revisited the matter and extended the
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. at 531.
Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
BREYER ET AL., supra note 75, at 46 (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (4th ed. 1976)).
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933).
Id. § 3(a).
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program if it so chose. Let there be divided power and the President
will see his delegation shrink as the usual wall of suspicion rises. Indeed, the real tragedy of striking down this unholy situation on nondelegation grounds is that it invited the perpetuation of various bits
of the program through other legislation, such as the Agricultural
85
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, the Agricultural Adjustment Act
86
87
of 1938, and the National Labor Relations Act, all of which have
more structure.
The creation of permanent agencies inside the executive branch
gives rise to other questions of legislative oversight. In this regard, it
is no coincidence, in my view, that the first appearance of the legislative veto is in 1932, at the start of the New Deal revolution, only to
88
expand in popularity hereafter. These vetoes could be done by a
single house of Congress or by both houses acting in concert. But
one feature common to both systems was that the action in Congress
did not meet the dual constitutional requirements of presentment
89
and bicameralism. The dual requirements were part of the general
scheme that was intended to fortify one central tenet of limited government: its basic presumption against the passage of new legislation.
The legislative veto is, of course, a legislative device that allows either house of Congress, or even some fraction thereof, to override
decisions in individual cases made within the bowels of the executive
branch. It can only be introduced by general legislation, and is subject to repeal in the same fashion, so that it would be wrong to think
of the process as one that either or both houses of Congress could
adopt simply on their own motions. Wholly apart from the textual
issues, it could easily be justified on the ground that it is yet another
of the many adjustments to constitutional structure that make sense
in light of the huge change in scope and scale of federal operations.
Put otherwise, once expansion of federal power gets larger, other ad85
86
87
88
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Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246.
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006).
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justments have to be made as well. In response, it can be argued that
the constitutional structure is intended to guard against just these alterations of the process through legislative means. The President
gets a veto of legislation from the Congress. Congress does not get to
veto the executive actions of the President and his officers.
The crosscurrents on this issue first came before the Supreme
Court only forty years after the practice was first instituted, which of
course tilts the balance implicitly in favor of its constitutionality.
90
Nonetheless, the watershed case of INS v. Chadha addressed the constitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act, insofar as it provided that if either the Senate or the House announced that it did
not support the suspension of the deportation of an alien by the Attorney General, the Attorney General was bound to deport the alien
or to otherwise arrange for his voluntary departure. The House of
Representatives overturned the Attorney General’s decision to suspend Chadha’s deportation, rejecting in effect the administrative determination of hardship. The issue before the Court was whether the
decision comported with the rigid system of separation of powers.
The Court concluded that the decision did not so comport because it
did not take the presentation and bicameralism requirements seriously.
The first point to note about this odd statute is that it was only a
one-way ratchet. The basic legislation did not allow either house of
Congress to suspend any deportation that had been ordered the Attorney General. It only allowed them to overturn decisions that suspended deportation. The usual instinct in actions that have real consequences to individuals is to give them, not the state, all the
procedural advantages; but this was not a case where the deported
alien could make a last-ditch plea. So the issue is: why do the procedural rules cut in the opposite direction? The explanation must run
along the following lines. The individual who is deported has every
incentive to fight the entire matter in the courts. If there is a sweetheart deal with Attorney General, however, then there is no one with
standing to challenge it. The matter, therefore, comes back to Congress, which faces constant protectionist pressures to keep immigration down to limit the competition with domestic workers, which is
built into the fabric of all our H1B visas. So how then to classify the
peculiar arrangements? It is surely not legislation, as it only applies
to a single individual. Unlike private member bills, it does not go
through both houses, and is in any event the review of a judicial deci-
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sion. Yet, by the same token, it is surely not any form of adjudication
since the action is valid without any hearing, a report or a statement
91
of reasons. And it does not look as though it is an exercise of executive power. Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck the statute down
on the ground that it did not comply with the minimum require92
ments of legislation, namely presentment and bicameralism. If anything, the statute looks closest to a Bill of Attainder, which the Consti93
tution prohibits the states from enacting.
But it hardly matters.
There are thousands of these veto provisions that are actively used
today. Chadha, it appears, has not made a dent in the old system
whose formal requirements are often too stiff. And at this point, the
old practices continue to hold sway.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, any analysis of the unitary executive cannot take place in a
constitutional void. Within the early constitutional framework of limited federal powers, the issue is not all that acute because there are
few issues with which the Congress cannot deal in advance. But as
the systems become larger and more ambitious, the entrenched position of the President puts Congress in a more difficult position, to the
extent that its (current) majority perceives long term conflicts with
the executive branch. As I have argued elsewhere, the rise of the independent administrative agency is yet another tile in the complex
mosaic that ushers in the expansion of government power through a
relaxation of the federalism limitations under the Commerce Clause
and the property and economic liberties protections under the Bill of
94
Rights. These lockstep maneuvers make sense if divided government is thought to be the problem rather than the solution. But in
its own way, a strong defense of the President’s removal power is that
it increases the costs of legislative/executive cooperation, which, on
balance, leads to smaller government. This, in turn, is a blessing
whose benefits are sorely missing today. It is possible to lament the
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current path of development. But so long as we live in an era of big
government, it is not possible to change it.

